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Professor Alexander’s final monograph is an exploration of what he 
has termed “human flourishing theory.” Human flourishing theory holds 
that the ownership of private property carries with it obligations to foster 
human flourishing—whether of individual neighbours or local 
communities.1 This Article examines two cases in the British law of 
easements and servitudes, where the judiciary expanded the scope of 
doctrines of land law so as to uphold the legal right of neighbours to use 
private land. In the case of Regency Villas Title Ltd. v. Diamond Resorts 
(Europe) Ltd. (hereinafter, “Regency Villas”),2 the UK Supreme Court 
(UKSC) upheld an easement held by timeshare owners to use the 
recreational facilities of the country club established in the grounds of the 
estate where they had purchased residences.3 Thus, for the first time in 
English law, the court recognized and upheld a pure easement of 
recreation.4 In the case of Home v Young (“Eyemouth”), the Scots Court 
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 1 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING xix (2018). 
 2 Regency Villas Title Ltd. v. Diamond Resorts Ltd. [2018] UKSC 57, 1 WLR 1603. 
 3 Id. at 29–30. 
 4 Id. at 2, 29–30. See Chris Bevan, Opening Pandora’s Box? Recreation Pure and 
Simple: Easements in the Supreme Court, 2019 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 55, 62–63 (2019). 
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of Session upheld the right of the inhabitants of the burgh of Eyemouth to 
use the well and drying green on the land of George Home.5 In doing so, 
the court broke free of the doctrine of servitudes that had for many years 
hindered the recognition of the rights of burgh inhabitants over private 
land and created a new doctrine—that of community rights.6 
This Article argues that key developments in the doctrines of 
easements and servitudes occurred in these cases because the judges 
applied legal reasoning that exemplifies Professor Alexander’s human 
flourishing theory. In both the English case of Regency Villas and the Scots 
case of Eyemouth, the judges shifted the focus of their enquiry from the 
land itself to the people living on the land, their needs and the uses to which 
they put the land to fulfill those needs. This shift of judicial focus to human 
need and the role of property in fulfilling those needs resulted in common 
law developments that in Scotland broadened the category of people who 
could claim rights of use over a neighbour’s land under a new doctrine of 
‘community right’ and in England broadened the nature of rights that can 
be claimed as an easement. The ‘human flourishing reasoning’ employed 
by the judges in these cases ennabled these developments. 
Land in the United Kingdom is often viewed by Americans as 
remarklably open for recreational use. There is a national system of 
footpaths and bridleways,7 communities have protected green spaces on 
which to play (or, famously, dance around a Maypole),8 and neighbours 
take short-cuts across each other’s gardens to reach public and community 
recreation grounds.9 Comparatively speaking, there is far more public, 
community, and neighbourly use of privately held land in the UK than in 
the United States.10 This is because the common law, under a variety of 
doctrines, gives rights of access to privately held land to neighbours, 
defined communities, and the public at large.11 Morevoer, these doctrines 
 
 5 Home v. Young, 9 D. 286 (Scot.). 
 6 Id.; Andrea Loux Jarman, Customary Rights in Scots Law: Test Cases on Access 
to Land in the Nineteenth Century, 28 J. LEGAL HIST. 207, 223 (2007). 
 7 Law & Your Environment, Public Rights of Way (2017), 
http://www.environmentlaw.org.uk/rte.asp?id=207. 
 8 One of Carole Rose’s favorite cases involved the successful claim of English 
villagers to dance around a maypole in the case Hall v. Nottingham, (1875-76) 1 Exch. Div. 
1; Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI L. REV. 711, 776 (1986); Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable 
Trend Toward Universally Recognizable Signals of Property Claims: An Essay for Carol 
Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015,1019 (2011). 
 9 Such easements are known as a private right of way. Land Registry Title Deeds 
Online, Private Rights of Way (2014), https://www.landregistry-
titledeeds.co.uk/frequently-asked-questions/information/private-rights-of-way.asp. 
 10 Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use? – The Need for a New 
Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 761–68 (1974). 
 11 Nicola Laver, Public Rights of Access to Private Land, 
https://www.inbrief.co.uk/land-law/right-to-roam/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
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have also been subject to significant legislative change and enlargement.12 
The nature of the rights of use that could be claimed over private land, 
by whom and on whose behalf lie at the heart of access to land litigation 
both historically and today.13 The cases explored in this Article involve the 
use of private land by neighbours under the distinct but related doctrines 
of easements and servitudes. In England, such uses of private land fall 
under the common law doctrine of easements.14 In Scotland, similar uses 
are recognised under the law of servitudes.15 These doctrines are from two 
different jurisdictions and are distinct; nevertheless, they share the same 
Roman law origins.16 Moreover, the law of servitudes is one area of Scots 
law that has interpenetrated English law17 and, through England and 
Scotland’s shared final court of appeal, can be said, at times, to have 
dominated the English law of easements.18  Although Scots’ UKSC 
decisions (formerly, House of Lords decisions)19 are only persuasive 
authority in English courts, Scots servitude cases have heavily influenced 
the development of the English doctrine of easements—both historically 
and in contemporary English law.20 
Easements and servitudes differ from both customary rights and 
public rights.  Those categories of rights of use over private land are held 
by any inhabitant of a community or member of the public in whose name 
 
 12 See, e.g., Commons Act 2006 (Eng.) (under which town greens are registered) and 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. 
 13 See, e.g., Andrea C. Loux, The Great Rabbit Massacre – A “Comedy of the 
Commons”? Custom, Community and Rights of Public Access to the Links of St. Andrews, 
22 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 123, 123–45 (2000) (detailing the case evolution of customary rights 
as well as public and private rights of use); Dempster v. Cleghorn (1813) 3 Eng. Rep. 40, 
42–48 (Scot.) (creating a contentious but influential precedent of customary rights to public 
land); R v. Oxfordshire CC (Ex parte Sunningwell Par. Council) [1999] UKHL 28, [2000] 
1 AC (HL) 335 (appeal taken from Eng.) (discussing the evolution of private and public 
rights of way). 
 14 Regency Villas Title Ltd. v. Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd. [2018] UKSC 57, [2] 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
 15 Jarman, supra note 6, at 212. 
 16 See John A. Lovett, Meditations on Strathclyde: Controlling Private Land Use 
Restrictions at the Crossroads of Legal Systems, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 7–9; 
In re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131, 162–63. 
 17 See C.G. van der Merwe, Interpenetration of Common Law and Civil Law as 
Experienced in the South African and Scottish Law of Property, 78 TUL. L. REV. 257, 274–
81 (2003). 
 18 See, e.g., Moncrieff v. Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42, [2008] All ER 752, [36], [63], 
[111] (upholding a servitude of parking). This is the only decision from the final appellate 
court on this contentious issue. 
 19 The House of Lords (Judicial) was replaced by the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom under the terms of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 (UK). 
 20 See Moncrieff v. Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42, [2008] All ER 752, at [11], [45], 
[111]. 
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the right has been found to exist, irrespective of whether they own land.21 
Easements and servitudes can only exist between parcels of land—a 
dominant tenement, the land that is benefitted by the use of another’s 
land—and the servient tenement, the burdened land over which the use is 
exercised.22 
An easement or servitude can benefit a single landowner or a 
community of landowners, so long as there is a parcel of land or “dominant 
tenement” in which the easement or servitude can be claimed.  In Regency 
Villas, the subject of the first case study of human flourishing reasoning, 
the claimants were all owners of timeshares who had been individually 
granted an easement to use recreational facilities as part of the land they 
had purchased.23 In the second human flourishing case explored in this 
Article, Home v. Young, the inhabitants of the burgh of Eyemouth claimed 
a servitude of access to a well and drying green in the name of the 
incorporated burgh as the dominant tenement.24  The first requirement of 
an easment in English law or a servitude in Scots law is that there exists 
both a dominant and servient tenement.25 
I. HUMAN FLOURISHING THEORY AND THE LAW OF EASEMENTS: 
REGENCY VILLAS AND THE EASEMENT OF RECREATION 
The case of Regency Villas involved the claim of an easement by 
owners of time share properties situated on the country estate of Broome 
Park, which is located near Canterbury in Kent.26  The key to this timeshare 
scheme was that the owners of the timeshares and their guests would get 
free membership to the country club and use of the recreational facilities.27 
Thus, with their freehold, the following rights were transferred: 
the right for the Transferee its successors in title its lessees 
and the occupiers from time to time of the property to use 
the swimming pool, golf course, squash courts, tennis 
courts, the ground and basement floor of the Broome Park 
Mansion House, gardens and any other sporting or 
recreational facilities (hereafter called ‘the facilities’) on 
the Transferor’s adjoining estate.28 
 
 21 See Jarman, supra note 6, at 207 n.1, 215–16. 
 22 Id. at 212–13; see also In re Ellenborough Park, [1956] Ch 131, 154. 
 23 Regency Villas Title Ltd. v. Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd. [2018] UKSC 57, [2], 
[16] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 24 See Home v. Young [1846] 9 D 286, 286–89 (Scot.). 
 25 See id. at 292 n.*. See also Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC 57 at [35]. 
 26 Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC 57 at [3]. 
 27 Id. at [6]. 
 28 Id. at [8]. 
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The question to be answered in Regency Villas was whether this “facilities 
grant,” as the court termed it, was “capable in law of amounting to one or 
more easements.”29 
The sheet-anchor case concerning easements in English law is the 
case of Re Ellenborough Park (hereinafter, Ellenborough Park), and the 
UK Supreme Court in Regency Villas accepted the four-part test of an 
easement set out in that case.30 In order for an easement to exist, firstly, as 
discussed above, there must be a dominant and a servient tenement.31 
Secondly, “an easement must ‘accommodate’ the dominant tenement.” 32 
Thirdly, “the dominant and servient owners must be different persons.”33 
Fourthly, “a right over land cannot amount to an easement unless it is 
capable of forming the subject-matter of a grant.”34 
English courts have traditionally strictly adhered to these legal 
requirements for recognizing an easment for two reasons. Firstly, 
easements are proprietary rights, capable of registration on the land 
register, which ‘run with the land’ from owner to owner.35 In short, 
easements are lasting property rights that are not easily discharged, and so 
courts stricly adhere to the common law rules governing their 
recognition.36  Another reason for strict common law limits on the 
recognition of legal easements is that in addition to those easements that 
are expressly granted, such as the facilities grant in Regency Villas, 
easements can arise both by implication and prescription.37 Easements that 
arise through implication or prescription bind subsequent owners even 
though they do not appear on the land register.38 
Easements by implication—that is, eassements that the court will 
imply into the deed of transfer—can arise in four ways under both 
common law and stautory rules.39 By way of example, the simplest implied 
easement is one that arises by necessity.40 Where a house would be 
landlocked because without an easement there would be no ingress or 
egress or, as in a recent case, would lack the basic utilities needed to be 
 
 29 Id. at [21]. 
 30 In re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131, 140. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Regency Villas Title Ltd v. Diamond Resorts Ltd., (2019) AC 553, 563. 
 36 See id. at 573, 582, 586. 
 37 See generally, 2 Cal. Real Est. Digest 3d Easements and Licenses § 3 (discussing 
creation of easements) [hereinafter Easements and Licenses]. 
 38 Legal easements are interests that override under Schedule 1 of the Land 
Registration Act 2002. 
 39 See generally Easements and Licenses, supra note 37. 
 40 R v. Oxfordshire CC. ex p Sunningwell Parish Council [2000] 1 AC 335, 349. 
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habitable,41 the court will deem that an easement has arisen by necessity, 
and the property right will be implied into the deeds of both the dominant 
and servient land owners.42 
Easments and servitudes can also arise through prescription or long, 
peaceable use.  The servitude claimed in Eyemouth, discussed below, arose 
through prescription.43 In England, where the owner or owners of a 
freehold can show that they have used neighbouring private land for a 
particular use or uses that are in the nature of an easment for the requisite 
period of time (today 20 years) without force, without secrecy and without 
permission, the land registry or court may recognise that a legal easement 
has been created through use and passage of time.44 The easement could 
arise at common law by alleged use since beyond the time of legal memory 
(1189), or under the theory of lost modern grant.45Finally, such an 
easement can also be recognised under the terms of the Prescription Act.46 
The permanence of  easements, combined with the variety of ways in 
which they can be created and recognized by a court, accounts for both the 
plethora of common law rules governing their creation and recognition 
that have developed over the years and the strictness with which courts 
have traditionally adhered to those rules. The court’s view in Regency 
Villas was that the granted easement, as one to use recreational facilities, 
potentially fell afoul of two of the four legal requirements of easements set 
out in the case of Ellenborough Park.47  Firstly, and in the court’s view 
most importantly, the court had to decide whether or not the easement 
claimed could be said to ‘accommodate a dominant tenement.’ 48  
Secondly, the court had to assess whether the easement claimed was one 
that could form the subject matter of a grant.49 
II. ACCOMMODATE THE DOMINANT TENAMENT—IS THE FACILITIES 
 
 41 Donovan v. Rana [2014] EWCA 99. 
 42 Necessity and Permissive Easements, FINDLAW, 
https://realestate.findlaw.com/land-use-laws/necessity-and-permissive-easements.html 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
 43 See Home v. Young, 9 D. 286, 286-89 (Scot.). 
 44 Lyria Bennett Moses & Cathy Sherry, Unregistered Access: Wheeldon v. Burrows 
Easements and Easements by Prescription Over Torrens Land, 81 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 498 
(2007). 
 45 Id. Lost modern grant is a legal fiction employed by the common law, which holds 
that  upon 20 years’ use the court will presume that the easement arose by grant, now lost, 
of the servient owner. 
 46 Prescription Act 1832, § 2 (Eng.). 
 47 Regency Villas Title Ltd v. Diamond Resorts Ltd., [2019] AC 553, 558. 
 48 See id. at 557. 
 49 See id. at 554. 
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GRANT A PERSONAL OR PROPREITARY RIGHT? 
The question of whether the easement or “facilities grant”  could be 
said to accommodate the dominant tenement was, from the court’s point 
of view, the most important of the two questions posed on appeal about 
the nature of the easement claimed in Regency Villas.50 Easements are 
proprietary rights and thus must not be of mere personal advantage to the 
owner but must be of benefit to the land to which they are appurtenant.51 
This is what is meant by the phrase “accommodate the dominant 
tenement.” In order for a type of use to be a right of easement, it must 
benefit the land to which it is attached (and of which it forms a part).52 
Most traditional easements are closely associated with the physical 
land of the dominant tenement.  They facilitate access to it or ensure that 
utilities can service it.53 Indeed, a traditional test of whether or not an 
easement sufficiently “accomodates a dominant tenement” is to ask 
whether the absence of such a right in a deed could give rise to an implied 
easement by necessity.54 
Eaements of recreation and sport are more attenuated from the land 
itself.  The potential objection to an easement of recreation is that it could 
not be said to benefit the land of the dominant tenement.55 The enjoyment 
of recreation and sporting rights “may fairly be described as an end in 
itself, rather than a means to an end (i.e., to the more enjoyable or full use 
of the dominant tenement).”56 Traditionally such rights were dismissed as 
ones of mere “recreation and amusement” that could not amount to an 
easement.57 
The easement of peramubulation in the gardens of Ellenborough Park 
potentially violated this rule, and the easement in that case was challenged 
upon the same grounds of that in Regency Villas.58 Ultimately, the easment 
to walk in the gardens and take advantage of any of the recreational 
facilities in Ellenborough Park had been held to accommodate the 
dominant tenements of the houses fronting and in close vicinity of the 
park.59 The houses were part of a planned community with the park 
 
 50 See id. at 571. 
 51 See id. at 563. 
 52 See id. at 557. 
 53 See id. at 572–73. 
 54 See, e.g., Donovan v. Rana [2014] EWCA 99, where easement rights for utilities 
were implied into the deed of sale between the complainant neighbours and the owners to 
the dominant tenement “of necessity.” 
 55 See Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC at [44]. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at [59]. 
 58 See id. at [1]. 
 59 See Ellenborough Park, [1956] Ch. 131, 131 (CA). 
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forming the houses’ (admittedly communal) garden, a common-enough 
amenity to land.60 Moreover, the court held that use of the land made by 
the householders in that case was not one of “mere recreation and 
amusement,”61 but rather a “beneficial attribute of residence in a house as 
ordinarily understood.”62 The court was at pains to say that the 
homeowners’ use of the park was not merely for recreation but also for 
ordinary domestic purposes. One example, was the “taking out small 
children in permambulators.”63 Whilst today that sounds no different from 
a recreational stroll, the child-rearing advice of 1950’s England was that 
babies should be placed outside in their prams at the bottom of the garden 
for hours at a time. 
There was no such judicial massaging of the nature of the use in 
Regency Villas. The “facilities grant” was an easement to use recreational 
facilities. The court, however, did not doubt the utility of sport and 
recreation or that recreation and sport constituted a real benefit to human 
beings: 
[T]he advantages to be gained from recreational and 
sporting activities are now so universally regarded as 
being of real utility and benefit to human beings that the 
pejorative expression “mere right of recreation and 
amusement, possessing no quality of utility or benefit” 
has become a contradiction in terms . . . Recreation, 
including sport, and the amusement which comes with it, 
does confer utility and benefit on those who undertake it.64 
But could such a benefit be said to “accommodate the dominant tenement” 
such that it could be granted as a right of easement? Lord Briggs dismissed 
any notion that it could not. He pointed out that all easements: 
[s]ave only for easements of support (which may be said 
to benefit the land itself), [] generally serve or 
accommodate the use and enjoyment of the dominant 
tenement by human beings. Thus, a right of way makes 
the dominant tenement more accessible. Service 
easements enable the occupiers of the dominant tenement 
to receive water, gas and electricity. A drainage easement 
enables rainwater and sewage to be removed from land, 
in circumstances where its use would otherwise be 
 
 60 See id. at 133. 
 61 See id. at 179. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC at [59]. 
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inhibited by flooding.65 
Once the focus of inquiry was shifted from the physical land itself to the 
enjoyment of the land by the people on it, the court could see no 
impediment to the granted easement of access to recreational facilities 
being recognized as one that accommodates the dominant tenement.66 
According to the majority, the decision in Ellenborough Park was 
dispositive of the question whether a right of recreation and engaging in 
sport over a servient tenement could be held as an easement that 
“accommodates the dominant tenement” and was also held to support the 
court’s decision as to whether a “mere right of recreation and amusement” 
could be claimed as an easement (although, as noted, the Ellenbourgh Park 
Court, itself, had held the easement there not to be one of mere 
recreation).67 According to the majority, where “as here, the 
accommodation test is satisfied, then the fact that it may be a right to use 
recreational or sporting facilities does not, as the Ellenborough Park case 
makes clear, disable it from being an easement.”68 
The court held that whether the use alleged could be recognised as an 
easement was fundamentally a question of fact. “The question, in every 
such case is whether the particular recreational or sporting rights granted 
accommodate the dominant tenement.”69 Under the rule that an easement 
must “accommodate the dominant tenement,” easements must be 
connected to the land such that they facilitate the normal enjoyment of the 
land and its development. Here, where the properties were holiday time 
shares, the granted rights of recreation unarguably facilitated the normal 
use of the land by the people on it and their guests. Indeed, the free use of 
the adjacent leisure development was key to the time shares’ 
advertisement and sale. 
In the majority’s view, where suitable factual circumstances are 
demonstrated (and in this case they could not be doubted), the enjoyment 
of a right of recreation and sporting can form the basis of a proprietary 
right in the same way as traditional easements facilitate the enjoyment of 
owners and occupiers of houses.70 
There was a lone dissenter in Regency Villas, Lord Carnwath. He 
disagreed with the decision of the majority on the ground that the so-called 
right of easement, in order to exist, required positive action by the owner 
of the servient tenement.71 
 
 65 Id. at [39]. 
 66 See id. at [59]. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. at [59]. 
 69 Id. at [48]. 
 70 See id. at [81]. 
 71 See id. at [94]–[95]. 
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Although he agreed with the majority that the merits of the case all 
went one way—in favour of the owners of the timeshares—this did not 
mean that the court should “distort the correct understanding of a well-
established legal concept.”72  Indeed, he saw no need to do so given that 
the business model for the timeshares on Broome Park had failed so badly 
that it would be very unlikely ever to be repeated.73 In his view, “[n]either 
principle, nor any of the 70 or so authorities which have been cited to us, 
ranging over 350 years, and from several common law jurisdictions, come 
near to supporting the submission that a right of that kind can take effect 
as an easement.”74 
There is much merit in the dissent of Lord Carnwath, and it is at least 
arguable that the majority in Regency Villas went beyond recognising an 
easement that entailed a “novel use” and instead recognised a “wholly new 
form of property right.”75 If this is the case, it is interesting to consider 
why the majority chose this case to declare that an easement of recreation 
could exist. 
It appears fairly clear that the majority was keen to announce that an 
easement of recreation could exist in English law. It had been stated earlier 
that Ellenborough Park potentially stood for the proposition that an 
easement of recreation could be claimed in English law.76  But why choose 
this case in which to do so, when as Lord Carnwath points out, such facts 
are unlikely to arise again in future? 
The clue lies in the ‘fact centred’ nature of the court’s inquiry. Lord 
Briggs begins the judgment by telling us that “whether a particular grant 
of, or claim to, rights is capable of having the enduring proprietary quality 
of an easement is usually (as here) fact intensive.”77  Whatever may be 
said about the rights claimed in Regency Villas, there is no doubt that as 
rights attached to timeshares, it is impossible to argue that they do not 
facilitate the purposes and enjoyment of the people who are utilising the 
dominant land. Thus, whilst not affecting the physical land of dominant 
tenement itself, the use of the recreational facilities can nevertheless be 
said to be so intrinsic to the ownership and use of the dominant land that 
the facilities grant ‘accommodates the dominant tenement.’78 
 
 72 Id. at [94]. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. at [96]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See R v. East Sussex County Council, [2015] UKSC 7, [43]. 
 77 Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC at [2]. 
 78 See id. at [59]. 
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III. REGENCY VILLAS AND HUMAN FLOURISHING THEORY 
The majority in Regency Villas adopted a fact-centred, people-
focused approach to the question of whether the grant at issue had given 
rise to a proprietary right of easement.  By focusing on the needs of the 
people who own, lease or even visit the land,79 and the purposes for which 
they do so, a broader range of rights that are more attenuated from the 
physical land itself was recognised as supporting an easement. Moreover, 
the focus on the people on the land when judging whether the easement 
‘accommodates the dominant tenement’ confirms Regency Villas as an 
example of the judicial application of human flourishing theory. 
Human flourishing theory is a theory of land, land use, and land 
ownership that is grounded in the needs of people. It holds that it is a duty 
of those who own land to contribute to the fulfilment of human needs and 
the development of human capabilities so as to enable one’s neighbours 
and community members to flourish.80 The decision point in Regency 
Villas was when Lord Briggs acknowledged that despite the many 
definitions of the term “accommodate the dominant tenement,” which 
spoke only of “land,” and a “benefit to land,”  “easements generally serve 
or accommodate the use and enjoyment of the dominant tenement by 
human beings.”81 The contribution of recreation and sport to human 
flourishing was, in the court’s view, beyond dispute. Regency Villas 
ensured that an obligation to allow one’s private land to be used for 
recreation by other land owners and their guests could be a proprietary 
right—and thus truly an obligation of land ownership. 
Lord Carnwath may be correct that a whole new category of 
proprietary right was recognised by the majority in order to achieve this. 
But in doing so, the majority paved the way for other private law claims 
of easement rights to land for recreation and not only ones that have arisen 
by express grant but also those that might have arisen by prescription or 
an implied grant.82 
If it is surprising that English law did not, before Regency Villas, 
recognise a pure easement of recreation, it is even more surprising that 
there is no decided English common law position to support people using 
the beach for swimming and recreation.83 It might be the case that in the 
future, one way to make such a claim will be on the basis of an easement 
of recreation that has arisen by virtue of an implied grant or through long 
 
 79 Bevan, supra note 4, at 67. 
 80 See Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing 
Theory of Property, 43 HONG KONG L.J. 451, 451 (2013). 
 81 Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC at [39]. 
 82 See id. at [96]. 
 83 See East Sussex County Council, [2015] UKSC at [43]. 
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use by prescription. If so, it might prove useful that Regency Villas also 
stands for the proposition that an assertion of an easement that by its nature 
and extent resembles a public right will not be defeated on this ground.84 
IV. COMMUNITY RIGHTS IN SCOTS LAW AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
THEORY 
In Scots law, unlike English law, rights over land for community use 
could not be claimed by unincorporated localities. There was no analogous 
doctrine to that of “custom” under which local inhabitants could make 
claims over land by virtue of long or “immemorial” use.85 Also, unlike in 
England, in Scotland common land had been enclosed by a single, public 
parliamentary act rather than by piecemeal private statutes, so common 
land did not exist in Scotland in the way it did in England in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.86 
Where something akin to common land established by custom did 
exist was in the incorporated burghs. Burgh inhabitant rights over burgh 
land or land outwith the burgh were litigated as servitudes.87 At the time 
the case of Eyemouth was brought in the mid-1840s, a servitude could be 
established by prescription upon proof of forty years’ use.88  There were 
two ways for a landowner to resist a community’s claim that the 
inhabitants had a legal right to use land for particular purposes.  Firstly, 
servitudes required a dominant and servient tenement, so the status of 
those who were claiming rights of servitude as holders of a dominant 
tenement was subject to challenge.89 Secondly, the use claimed must have 
been one that the courts were willing to recognize as a servitude.90 In 
Eyemouth, the focus was on whether the defenders, as mere tenants of 
land, could claim a servitude where their landlords, who owned the 
dominant tenements, had disclaimed any such right.91 
In Scots law, royal burghs can hold servitudes, because the 
corporation holds or is “infeft” with the land of the burgh.92 Thus, a royal 
burgh, quá a corporation, holds a dominant tenement on behalf of all of its 
inhabitants.93 The accepted view was that a burgh of barony, like the burgh 
 
 84 See Regency Villas, [2018] UKSC at [52]. 
 85 See Andrea C. Loux, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility and 
the Common Law in Nineteenth-Century England, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 183 (1993). 
 86 See Jarman, supra note 6, 211–12. 
 87 Id. at 211–12, 214. 
 88 Prescription Act, 1617 (Scot.). See Loux, supra note 13, at 140. 
 89 See Jarman, supra note 6, at 211–12. 
 90 Id. at 213. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 209, 213. 
 93 See Jarman, supra note 6, at 213. 
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of Eyemouth, could not hold a servitude on behalf of its inhabitants 
because the corporation does not, itself, hold land. It is merely a 
corporation. Thus, whether as pursuers or defenders, landowners could 
attack a burgh of barony’s, or its inhabitants, claim of servitude on the 
ground that the community litigants held no dominant tenement (or 
otherwise lacked title to pursue).94 
The test case of Eyemouth is worthy of examination in the context of 
evaluating the development of the law of servitudes and easements in light 
of the theory of human flourishing. Like Regency Villas, the emphasis of 
the decision in Eyemouth was not the land itself but rather the needs of the 
people who lived on the land. The pursuer had set up the case in such a 
way so as to almost guarantee that, were the law of servitudes to be applied 
as it had been in times past, the land would be declared to be free of 
servitudes by the inhabitants of the burgh. 
Eyemouth became a test case—but a test case brought initially not on 
behalf of the public or a community, but on behalf of the landowner, who 
sought to circumscribe the rights of the inhabitants of the burgh. The case 
was brought on behalf of the proprietor and judicial factor of the lands and 
barony of Eyemouth. Home, in an effort to improve the estate, wanted to 
prevent members of the community from using a well and the land 
adjacent to it for washing and bleaching linen.95 
What made Eyemouth a test case was the way in which the pursers 
went about litigating it. The law regarding community servitudes was in a 
state of flux in the mid-nineteenth century, and when asked for an opinion 
on the matter, an advocate had advised Home not to bring the case.96 Of 
the two issues—whether the pursers held a dominant tenement and the 
nature of the use claimed by the defenders by prescription—the use of a 
well and land for drying and bleaching linen had, after a great deal of 
confused precedent, been recognized as a type of use that could be held as 
a servitude.97 If the defenders were vulnerable, it was with regard to the 
requirement that a servitude must be constituted between a dominant and 
servient tenement. 
In order to vitiate any claim to a community servitude, Home had 
contacted the absentee landlords of the named defenders to ensure that the 
landowners would not resist their action.98 This meant that the defenders, 
tenants of those landlords, could not claim a right of servitude attached to 
 
 94 Dempster v Cleghorn, [1813] 2 Dow 40, 42-43. See Loux, supra note 13, at 123. 
 95 Home v. Young, (1846) 9 D. 286, 287. 
 96 John Rankine, Home v. Pringle, The Scots Revised Reports 636 (1841). 
 97 Andrea Loux Jarman, Urban Commons: from Customary Use to Community Right 
on Scotland’s Bleaching Greens, LAW IN THE CITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE, DUBLIN, 319, 331 (2005). 
 98 Home v. Young, Scottish Jurist 109, 110. 
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their land. The owners of their houses had already disclaimed a servitude, 
and so the defender-inhabitants held no dominant tenement that could hold 
a servitude over the servient tenement of the Shore Well and the adjacent 
land, the Parade or Wellbraes. 
But as Home’s advocate in his advice not to bring the action had 
intimated, the issue was not so simple. For years, the courts had wrestled 
with how rights such as these, when claimed on behalf of burgh 
inhabitants, should be litigated and recognized.99 In Eyemouth, the focus 
was not on the rules of land law but rather the needs of the 1100 inhabitants 
of the burgh and how those needs were being protected in the absence any 
burgh governors having been elected. Home claimed that the absence of 
these governors meant that there was, in fact, no corporation that could 
claim in its corporate name the rights used by the inhabitants.100  The 
members of court rejected this claim and went further. 
In the absence of elected magistrates, the court held that Home 
himself, as the burgh superior, was responsible for ensuring that the land 
of the burgh was used for the purposes for which it was granted by the 
crown to the baron, “for behoof of the inhabitants.”101 The question of the 
inhabitants’ rights to the land were not a matter of private land law and the 
law of servitudes; rather, they were protected as a matter of public law and 
principles of good governance.102 The court held that the claimed rights, 
which were exercised on burgh land, were held by the baron on behalf of 
the inhabitants in a form of public trust.103 In the words of Lord Jeffrey, 
“[t]he case in reality, is not within the proper category of a servitude to be 
established against a stronger third party, but within the category of a mal-
administration, or attempted invasion of rights belonging to the 
community by those who ought to have respected and protected them.”104 
The judges found Home’s argument outrageous.105 Not only had he 
filed a legal action and then claimed that those he had filed it against had 
no title to defend it, he had also claimed that by the erection of the burgh, 
“there was not granted to the burgh any rights at all; no corporation 
created, no interest called into existence but one in favour of the baron 
himself.”106 An action brought on the ground of the land being a burgh of 
barony was, on this view according to Lord Mackenzie, “just an action 
brought by part of himself against himself, just as if his own leg were to 
 
 99 Id. at 295–96. 
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bring an action against the rest of him.”107 The judges of the First Division 
of the Court of Session were unanimous in their view that the use of the 
well and the land for drying and bleaching linen, so long as it was proved 
in fact to have existed for forty years, could be claimed by the defenders 
as inhabitants of the burgh, which was held to be a corporate body.108 
The judges all thought the rights claimed were something other than 
a praedial servitude that required a dominant and servient tenement. The 
Lord President emphasized that the rights claimed were over land that lay 
within the burgh and argued that the rights resembled an “easement” or 
right of use.109 Lord Mackenzie said “I don’t consider it necessary to enter 
into the question of servitude at all; for this is no servitude—it is no more 
a servitude than the right to the burgh jail. The baron has not the right to 
destroy the burgh; and, therefore . . . he could not exclude from the use of 
the air or the water.”110 
Lord Fullerton “admitted that the older cases are not satisfactory; and 
indeed it is not easy to extract from them any very distinct or intelligible 
principle.”111 But he sustained the right on the “broad ground of its being 
a public servitude.”112 “All the difficulty as to what is said in regard to the 
necessity of a praedium dominans is excluded by the fact that a body 
corporate has acquired it.”113 Lord Jeffrey agreed that the people of the 
burgh could no more be excluded from the well and adjacent bleaching 
green than they could “from the use of the streets, wharfs, or market-places 
they have enjoyed equally long.”114 For him, “[t]he form is to erect the 
territory into a free burgh of barony. The territory, no doubt, is the body 
of the burgh; but the soul, for whose sake it is created, is the living 
population. It rests, in short, on no system of Legal Materialism, but is 
truly constituted of the persons resident on the territory, who are 
recognised and united in a corporation, and expressly vested with certain 
rights and privileges.”115 
V. THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN FLOURISHING THEORY: 
PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 
In jurisprudential terms, the case of Eyemouth sits neatly beside the 
case of Regency Villas as one where the judicial reasoning used to 
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vindicate the use rights of a community over land exemplifies human 
flourishing theory. What links these cases is the emphasis that the 
respective courts placed on the needs and expectations of the people of the 
communities involved when coming to their decisions. To quote a 
ubiquitous English catchphrase, the application of human flourishing 
theory does “what it says on the tin.”  It focuses the attention of judges, 
lawyers, and jurisprudence scholars on the needs of the human beings that 
live on the land. 
In both the test cases of Regency Villas and Eyemouth, the 
landowners claimed that the law of easements and servitudes would not 
support the community’s use of their land. In Regency Villas, what was at 
issue was an expressly granted right of easement to a country club and 
other recreational facilities that was made as part of a sale of timeshares in 
an exclusive complex.116  In Eyemouth, inhabitants of the burgh of barony 
who did not own land, claimed that they had the right to a well and the 
land that beside it for the laying out of clothes and the cottage industry of 
bleaching of linen.117 In both of these cases, the merits were on the side of 
the communities asserting the right to use the land in dispute. Merits aside, 
however, the question nevertheless remained whether the court could rule 
in their favour, and if so, on what legal grounds. In both cases, the court 
found in favor of those asserting the use. In Regency Villas, the right of 
the large number of timeshare owners and their guests to use the country 
club facilities as they existed from time to time was upheld as a right of 
easement.118 The use was held to both “accommodate their dominant 
tenements” and to be a type of use that is capable of a grant as an 
easement.119  In Eyemouth, the rights of the inhabitants were also upheld, 
but as a right in public law rather than as a servitude.120 
In terms of judicial reasoning, both of these cases stand out because 
of the courts’ focus on the purposes for which the land is held by the people 
living on it and their needs. The rights asserted are confirmed by the 
respective courts, albeit under very different legal doctrines, on the 
grounds that the rights asserted were either necessary or facilitated the 
enjoyment of the land for the purposes for which the people were living, 
working or visiting it. Both of these cases changed the law of the land with 
regard to the proprietary rights of easements and servitudes.121 Regency 
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Villas recognized that a novel use of land could support an easement.122 
Eyemouth held that a corporation could, as a matter of public law, hold 
rights over land on behalf of a burgh’s inhabitants.123 Both of these courts 
supported the community’s claims by changing the prevailing paradigm 
of proprietary rights as primarily concerning land and directing their 
inquiry to the purposes and needs of the people living on the land. This 
change in paradigm was key to the decisions in the cases and to their place 
in the jurisprudence of human flourishing theory. 
In a sense, it is odd, or at the least ironic, that the notion that when 
deciding disputes over land that the appropriate judicial focus should be 
on the purposes for which people hold land and the uses that facilitate their 
enjoyment of it is, somehow, innovative. And yet, that focus in both 
Regency Villas and Eyemouth was truly innovative and enabled the 
respective courts to enlarge the category of uses that could be claimed as 
an easement and who could claim them. 
Arguably, what had prevented the development of the law in the area 
of easements and servitudes in both the English and Scots courts was the 
language of proprietary rights.  Proprietary rights burden land. Unlike 
personal rights, they are meant to be lasting and to outlive the ephemeral 
nature of the people who own or occupy the land.124 Because such rights 
can constitute permanent burdens on land, doctrines of land law require 
that rights over land such as easements and servitudes are established 
between dominant and servient tenements and that an easement must 
“accommodate the dominant tenement.”125 The language of the 
proprietary dominates the doctrinal discussion to such an extent that it is 
possible to lose very the notion that, ultimately, such rights are about the 
enjoyment of land by people. 
Land lawyers and judges are so familiar with both land law’s 
technical language of dominant and servient tenements and its inherent 
policy aims of limiting burdens on land so as it make land freely alienable 
that when taking doctrinal decisions the idea that the “right or utility” 
benefits the people on the dominant tenement can be wholly obscured. 
Lord Briggs, writing the majority judgment in Regency Villas, cut through 
this jargon of the proprietary to focus on the true beneficiaries of rights of 
easement—the people who live on the dominant tenement. 126 In 
Eyemouth, the same can be said of the decision of the First Division of the 
Court of Session. The court held that the right to use the well and bleaching 
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green beside it could be claimed on behalf of all of the burgh’s 1100 
inhabitants in the name of the corporation.127 This is because the use was 
considered to be as intrinsic to the life and work of the people of the burgh 
as were the streets, the jail, the air, or the water.128 
In Regency Villas, the dissenter, Lord Carnwath, accused the majority 
of having created a new form of proprietary right.129 The same charge 
could have been levelled at the First Division in Eyemouth. But the 
Eyemouth court had chosen a different route out of the quandaries 
presented to it by the combination of a rapacious, selfish owner of land 
demanding his right to exclude the burgh inhabitants despite their 
undoubted need to use it and the strictures of the law of servitudes that 
required there to be a dominant and servient tenement. The court neatly 
recategorized the question of the title to hold the right of the inhabitants 
over the land from one of the private law of servitudes to one of the public 
law of maladministration. Absent magistrates or any other burgh 
governors, the First Division held that the pursuer, Home himself as burgh 
superior, was responsible for protecting the right of the burgh 
inhabitants.130 Mark Napier, author of a treatise on the law of prescription 
and “keen controversialist” who was “unsparing in epithets of abuse”131 
was pleased to report, in the appendix to his volume, that the doctrine of 
servitudes had been saved by the case being “taken out of the category of 
proper servitudes altogether” and being decided as a matter of community 
right.132 
The decision in Eyemouth led directly to another test case—Dyce v. 
Hay133— where Robert Dyce claimed, on behalf of the inhabitants of Old 
Aberdeen, the right to a recreation ground on the land of Lady James Hay 
that lay between the footpath and the river Don.  Dyce brought his claim 
on the basis of the obiter dictum of Lords Fullerton and Jeffrey in 
Eyemouth that a burgh of barony could claim a servitude on land outwith 
the burgh and on the memorandum or “Note” of the Lord Ordinary that 
accompanied his report of Eyemouth to the full court for decision because 
of its importance. In that note, Lord Cunninghame claimed that “there had 
been a great change and enlargement, in modern times, as to the principles 
on which claims of servitude, or qualified uses of property, ought to 
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receive effect.”134 
Dyce v. Hay was heard by the (co-equal) Second Division of the 
Court of Session, where the Lord Justice-Clerk thought that the views of 
the Lord Ordinary had “received no countenance whatever in the Inner 
House.”135  There is contemporary evidence that the First Division would 
have viewed the claim of Robert Dyce on behalf of the inhabitants of Old 
Aberdeen in much the same light as they viewed the claim by the 
inhabitants of Eyemouth. The judges in Eyemouth were content that rights 
such as those claimed in that case could be held by the corporation on 
behalf of its inhabitants whether they were exercised over land within or 
without the burgh’s boundaries.136 But for the conservative members of 
the Dyce court, who had argued against the extension of community rights 
to recreation whilst at the Bar, the Eyemouth court’s transformation of the 
rights asserted from private law rights of servitude to ones held at public 
law as inhabitants of a feudal burgh was the basis upon which Robert 
Dyce’s claim could be dismissed. Cases that involved: 
[t]he relative rights of superior and vassal . . . or of baron 
and inhabitant of a burgh of barony, or of corporation and 
burgess—and the cases in which the inhabitants of a 
burgh of barony are maintaining certain privileges or 
rights as flowing from, or part of, the grant in the erection 
of the burgh of barony, or the burgesses or community of 
a burgh are contending that certain property belonging to 
the corporation is held mainly for the purpose of the 
public use of the whole community, or in which vassals 
on large feuing grounds are contending that the common 
superior had truly devoted part of his ground or wells, or 
water adjoining, for the benefit of those taking feus from 
him, so that such privilege came to be a pertinent or 
adjunct of the feu, or a part of a plan on which they relied 
in taking their feus . . . plainly involve . . . legal principles 
which do not apply at all to the ordinary case, such as we 
have before us.137 
The claim brought by Robert Dyce on behalf of the inhabitants was, in the 
view of Lord Justice-Clerk, one made between strangers and amounted to 
nothing less that the assertion of a public right over the land of an unrelated 
third party.138 
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In Dyce v. Hay, after the rhetoric and judicial decision in Eyemouth, 
the “good old right to exclude” was reasserted.  In common law systems, 
progressive decisions are oftentimes followed by reactionary ones, where 
more conservative judges are keen to reassert more traditional views.139 
But for advocates of “progressive property” and of the human flourishing 
thesis, the reinterpretation of the law of burgh servitudes in Eyemouth and 
its use in Dyce v. Hay may hold different lessons. 
The first (and there is some irony in this given my appearance at this 
symposium) is that however jurisprudentially illuminating, we must be 
wary of making direct doctrinal comparisons in property law between U.S. 
state law and the law of the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. While 
such comparisons  might provide innovative judgments and fleeting 
rewards, such as those enjoyed by those who access the dry sand beach in 
Oregon on the basis of English custom, the foundations of English and 
Scots law in feudal systems of landholding can provide rich fodder for 
those who wish to oppose such innovations.140 
The second is that when evaluating the duty of landowners to 
facilitate human flourishing, we must answer the question “a duty to whom 
and on what basis?” In Regency Villas, the factual analysis of the court 
took account of the interests of not only owners and occupiers but of 
invited guests.  Chris Bevan has argued that whilst, given the terms of the 
grant, this is not necessarily surprising, it might very well “mark . . . a 
departure from the orthodox position and an expansive new approach” that 
takes into account when evaluating the factual basis of a claim of easement 
the use not only of those with an interest in a servient tenement, but their 
invited guests or even the public.141 His concern is that 
[R]ecreational easements have the potential to be enjoyed 
by a far wider group of people when compared to more 
traditionally-recognised easements; people who may have 
little or no meaningful, lasting connection to the land. We 
await a test case on this point but there may be legitimate 
concerns as to the undue burden that recreational 
easements will impose on the servient land and land 
owners. Such burdens may be only magnified when the 
interests and expectations of visitors and guests to the land 
are, additionally, to be taken into account by the court.142 
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The echoes in this warning of conservative (with a small “c”) 
arguments from other cases where claims to proprietary rights demand 
innovations in order for them to be recognized are unmistakable. Inherent 
in legal doctrines like that of easements that contain within them the 
possibility of the recognition of new forms of proprietary rights is the 
reality that when such judicial decisions are taken, a host of political, 
sociological and ideological concerns will come to the fore. I have spent 
my time since leaving Cornell and being taught by Greg Alexander 
studying such moments of innovation in Britain’s land law. The lessons of 
history, such as those of the century and a half that it took between the 
decision in Dyce v. Hay and the decision in Regency Villas to recognize 
an easement of recreation, demonstrate that we must mind not only our 
doctrine, but our ideology and especially our theory. Professor Alexander 
has made a significant and lasting contribution to both legal theory and 
principles of progressive property. For those contributions, both as a 
teacher of land law and a scholar of land law and legal theory, I would like 
to honor and thank him. And thank you for the honour of appearing at this 
very special Progressive Property Symposium. 
